Executive Summary
This sector analysis will focus on the military application of semi-autonomous and autonomous drones in the Ukraine–Russia war. Several key trends in the Ukraine–Russia war characterize the adoption of AI-enabled drones in contemporary warfare. First, there is a rapid transition from remotely piloted systems toward semi-autonomous and increasingly autonomous platforms, driven by advances in onboard computing, navigation algorithms, and automatic target recognition (ATR) capabilities (King, 2024; Bondar, 2025). Second, conflict environments–particularly asymmetric wars like Ukraine–Russia–are accelerating technology innovation cycles, effectively turning battlefields into real-world testing environments for AI applications (Fried, 2025; Smith, 2024; Stuart, 2025). Third, the diffusion of commercial drone technology combined with modular AI components is lowering barriers to entry, creating a bottom-up supply-chain of drone production at extremely low costs (Bendett & Kirichenko, 2025; Nieczypor & Matuszak, 2025). Together, these trends suggest that AI-enabled autonomy is becoming a decisive margin of military advantage (Rossiter, 2026) with implications extending beyond this conflict.
Historical Overview: From Automated to Semi-Autonomous Drones
Drone technology has markedly improved over the past few decades, earning a reputation as being “the fastest-growing and most transformative technological development in modern warfare” (Eprikian et al., 2025). Recent innovations include shifts from: manned to unmanned systems; radio-controlled to first-person-view (FPV) operation; unguided to precision-guided delivery; and drones designed solely for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to drones equipped with both ISR capabilities and delivery of lethal payloads (Chivers, 2025), among others. One of the most significant changes over the past two decades–and the focus of this analysis–has been the integration of AI into drones, enabling increased levels of autonomy in navigation and targeting (King, 2024). This shift has made AI one of the single “most important margins of competition in modern conflict” (Wood, 2025), especially in an asymmetric setting such as the Ukraine–Russia war (Garcia, 2025).
Ukraine’s use of drone technology has evolved significantly since the war began in February 2022, and these developments are shaping the economic outlook for the industry. At the onset of the war, Ukraine relied heavily on commercial, off-the-shelf, Chinese-made drones, mainly capable of providing ISR, which Ukrainians later adapted to carry targeted munitions (CSIS, 2026; Fried, 2025). Beginning in 2024, however, Ukrainians began integrating AI into drone production, significantly enhancing their functional landscape to provide real-time data analysis and increased autonomous decision-making (Bondar, 2025; Raut & Madwal, 2025). This transition from automated to autonomous systems marked an important shift, as autonomous drones have the capability of accomplishing objectives independently or with minimal human oversight, significantly enhancing special functions, such as imagery analysis, target recognition and tracking, and autonomous navigation (Bondar, 2025).
According to Nathan Michael, CTO of Shield AI, these advancements are transforming warfare (Smith, 2024). Although most drones still require a human pilot, new Ukrainian-made drones are being equipped with AI to chase and strike targets “with no further human involvement” (Bondar, 2025; Chivers, 2025). Right now, the Ukrainian military continues to employ a human-in-the-loop approach to drone warfare; however, according to CSIS Fellow Kateryna Bondar, the long-term objective is for Ukraine to “maximize autonomy…whenever it supports improved operational effectiveness” (2025).
Current and Emerging Developments in AI Adoption
Outmatched in capability and numerical superiority, Ukraine has been forced to quickly innovate and accelerate the deployment of AI-enabled drones, thereby improving performance across two key areas: navigation and automatic target recognition (ATR). For navigation, by integrating advanced AI algorithms and cameras directly onto the drone, these platforms gained the capacity to make instantaneous decisions, gather intelligence, collect real-time 3D terrain maps, and identify the positioning of enemy fortifications and troop movements (Bondar, 2025; Gartner, 2025). ATR, defined as the” use of computer processing to detect and identify targets automatically” (Verly, 1989) improved Ukraine’s ability to target enemy combatants. Early in the war, Ukraine drone attacks hit targets at a reported rate of about 10 to 15%; after integrating AI, this rate increased to 70 to 80%, representing a roughly threefold increase in effective targeted strikes (Bondar, 2025). These advancements drove a marked increase in targeting accuracy, and a decrease in overall strike costs, minimizing the cost-to-kill ratio, which estimates place around 1:10000–1:25000 (Bondar, 2025; Eprikian, 2025) and freeing up resources to invest in drone production, among other material needed for the war effort.
Together, improvements in navigation and ATR have profoundly reshaped Ukraine’s operational and tactical advances by equipping the military with faster, more accurate, and up-to-date information about potential enemy targets and their movements (Abdurasulov, 2025; Bondar, 2025; Verly et al., 1989). The efficacy of these systems–highly adaptable and modular, often one-way, low-cost, FPVs–has resulted in greater procurement of autonomous drones (Bondar, 2025; Smith, 2024). Advancements don’t stop there. As Chivers forebodes at the beginning of his New York Times piece, “Most drones require a human pilot. But some new Ukrainian drones, once locked on a target, can use A.I. to chase and strike it — with no further human involvement” (2025). How widespread their use is remains unclear.
Projected Growth
Drone production levels in Ukraine have grown exponentially since the onset of the war. This is driven less by market expansion than by wartime urgency where drone attrition rates remain high (Nieczypor & Matuszak, 2025), thus necessitating replacement drones. Although figures vary and reporting rarely distinguishes between drone types, the following data points may illustrate how much drone production has increased. In 2022, Ukraine produced approximately 1,200 drones; in 2023, 800,000 drones (Reeves, 2025); and in 2024, approximately 2 million drones (Bondar, 2025). For 2025, the Ukraine government set a production target of 4.5 million, over 2 million of which are projected to be FPV drones (Axe, 2025; Nieczypor & Matuszak, 2025). Moreover, most of this production is domestic (Bondar, 2025). It is important to note that not all commercial drones are equipped with AI and machine learning components; however, as demonstrated in Ukraine, commercial platforms can be readily modified for military use. This adaptability lays a precarious foundation for how AI-enabled drones are shaping the future of warfare.
Costs and Risks
The adoption of semi-autonomous drones confers clear advantages for Ukraine, namely enhanced strategic and operational effectiveness, improved force protection, and increased domestic drone production that spurs economic growth and innovation—even pushing private firms to market systems as “battle-tested in Ukraine” (Bendett & Kirichenko, 2025). Large quantities of inexpensive, easy-to-operate, and replaceable drones offer much-needed support to Ukraine frontline personnel often affected by fatigue or stress, and expand the pool of people capable of contributing to the war effort (Bondar, 2025; Gartner, 2025). However, as both Ukraine and Russia continue to pursue fully autonomous weapons, ethical boundaries are increasingly at risk of being crossed, particularly regarding the loss of meaningful human control over lethal decision-making. Out-of-the-loop AI-enabled drones, the UN Secretary General warned, “...could worsen the frequency and intensity of conflicts and precipitate humanitarian crises” (United Nations Secretary-General, 2024, p. 10).
Conclusion and Recommendations
Ukraine has successfully leveraged advances in drone technology to offset Russia’s military superiority; however, conflict pressures–as demonstrated in Ukraine–are quickly spreading to other parts of the world, resulting in a global push towards developing fully autonomous drones (Stuart, 2023). To mitigate this risk, policymakers should prioritize three measures: develop agreed-upon, enforceable frameworks governing the use of autonomous drones in warfare (Garcia, 2025) including strict prohibitions for the use of autonomous drones for strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure; establish clear, human-in-the-loop accountability thresholds for drone producers; and, coordinate multilateral import-export controls on critical components to limit the diffusion of autonomous technology. While these recommendations are not exhaustive, they are grounded in existing U.S. policy on autonomous weapons (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023) and United Nations guidance emphasizing human control, accountability, and risk mitigation (United Nations Secretary-General, 2024).
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Written as part of graduate coursework in AI Management & Policy, Purdue University.